This course is Part 2 of the Social Norms, Social Change series. In this course, we will examine social change, the tools we may use to enact change, and put into practice all we have learned in Part 1. See Social Norms, Social Change Part I at this link: https://coursera.org/learn/norms This course covers scripts and schemas, the cognitive structures in which social expectations are embedded, and their relationship with social norms. The course then examines the essentials of norm abandonment, including the relations between personal beliefs and social expectations. We will also evaluate existing intervention strategies, including legal reforms, information campaigns, economic incentives, and group deliberations. Finally, we look at a variety of tools policy makers may use to effect change, highlight the role of trendsetters in social change, and explore the conditions under which they can be successful. The course is a joint Penn-UNICEF project." Please see the following link for a 30% discount on the book that accompanies this course: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/9780190622053/?cc=us&lang=en&promocode=AAFLYG6
11.6
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Del curso dictado por University of Pennsylvania
Social Norms, Social Change II
137 calificaciones
De la lección
Norm Abandonment
This module covers the essentials of norm abandonment, including the relations between personal beliefs and social expectations. It also evaluates existing intervention strategies, including legal reforms, information campaigns, economic incentives, and group deliberations.
Conoce a los instructores
Cristina BicchieriS. J. Patterson Harvie Professor of Social Thought and Comparative Ethics
Department of Philosophy
[MUSIC]
In addition to legal intervention, described in the last video of
the current lecture, economic incentives can trigger norm
change by altering the cost and benefits of the target behavior.
The idea is that providing a payment for the adoption of a desirable
behavior should steer individuals towards it.
Yet, several studies have shown that monitoring incentives can backfire.
For example, in a famous study in the 70s Titmos showed that paying
people to donate blood could result in a reduction of the proportion of donors.
Possibly because doing so broke a normal voluntary contribution.
This crowding out of intrinsic motivation
is linked to a variety of signals that monetary incentive may provide.
The activity may be reframed as a monetary transaction
thus obscuring it's moral significance.
If the price is too low, it may signal that the activity is of low importance,
discouraging engagement in it.
Finally, a monetary incentive may implicitly suggest
that an inducement is needed to keep people from skirting the activity.
For example, incentivizing people to pay taxes or
generally contribute to the public good would signal that incentives
are needed because people in general do not easily contribute.
Introducing fines to discourage some behavior
May also produce a clouding out affect.
Nissi and
Rostukini did a field experiment within eleven real daycare centers in Israel.
Since parents at time came late to pick up their children
some of the daycare centers used a fine for the late comers.
Surprisingly, these are resulted in an increase in the number of late pick ups.
Presumably, parents now perceived the monetary cost of lateness as
a justification for their behavior if they pay the required fine,
they do not feel as bad to showing that late.
When one can pay a small fine for
bad behavior it signals that the behavior was not all that bad in the first place.
Otherwise, why is the fine so low?
The small fine may have lead people to undervalue
the significance of being late and also provide a remedy for being late.
Now, one pays for it.
Here are the results in terms of late arrivals of introducing a fee and
later on removing it.
As you can see from the figure, when the fine was introduced,
there was a slight decline in late pick ups, but
at week five we see a steep increase in the number of parents who arrive late.
At week 17 when the fine was removed, parents were more likely to pick up their
children late then they were before the intervention.
Introducing a fine, transform what was originally a norm of courtesy, one should
not be late and make daycare workers stay longer, into a market transaction.
And after the fine was removed,
the behavior was not restored to its original normative status.
This study and many other show the dark side of the crowding out effect
of monetary incentives.
When the incentive is removed, the motivation to perform a task without
the additional monetary incentive can be permanently reduced.
The crowding out effect is an example of the involuntary framing
of the situation through the activation of a particular script.
Monetary incentive may induce the activation of the market script
with a result that the activity that was previously disapproved
now becomes admissible.
So longer as a price is paid.
Another effect of pricing an activity like providing incentives for pro-social
behavior is that activity gets anchored that was specific monitoring value
that might be much lesser than what one would have originally value to
that engaging in pro-social behavior, such as volunteering, may gratify people.
Yet, paying them a small fee to volunteer may downgrade the activity
by signaling that it has little value.
In addition to changing normative behaviors into market transaction
a further negative effect of monetary incentive is that they signal
both to one's peers and to one's self that one is doing it for
the money, rather than for moral reasons.
For example, it has been shown that simply offering gets more monetary incentive
to donate significantly to increase the blood donation rates.
But when people were offered the opportunity to donate the money
to charity, blood donation rates returned to their original level
donating the money reaffirms the original signal that one is morally motivated.
Monetary incentives have been used to build latrines, send girls to school,
curb child marriage, encourage the use of condoms, and get children vaccinated.
The results of such incentives are mixed.
Incentives in education have often been successful.
Paying families to keep girls in school longer increases the opportunity cost
of marrying them off earlier and makes a girl more valuable to the family.
Who begins to treat her as a long term investment.
Not only are girls kept in school longer, but they are better nourished as well.
In this case, the incentive is very specific, keeping the girl in school for
a set number of years.
The target behavior is limited in time, as school eventually ends.
And it is easy to monitor successful outcomes.
Incentives to build a newest latrines, however, have not met with much success.
Latrines are initially built but sooner put to other uses.
We have seen that, a storage, kitchen, or animal shelter.
The monetary incentive in this case
was meant to use a bundle of different activities.
Since abandoning open defecation involves not just building latrines but
also keeping them factional and using them consistently monitoring or
such activities is a difficult task.
Moreover the target behavior is not limited in time but
has to continue indefinitely.
The Water Bank Water and Sanitation Program in India
has provided significant amount of money for constructing latrines.
Yet, even with substantial subsidies to induce people to use them,
half of the toilets went unused.
One reason the program did not work was that the target community was not involved
in the process of understanding the damage caused by open defecation.
Which could have resulted in a collective decision to abandon the practice.
What is needed to abandon of identification is a different sort of
incentive.
People will have to be convinced that a sustained and
continuous effort is worthwhile.
The nomenclature model I have described in lecture ten,
suggests that when dealing with ongoing long term practices that involve
many connected behaviors and considerable monitoring.
Sustainable behavioral change requires paradigm shift
from economic incentives to creating new norms.
This does not imply that the government should not materially help by
providing tools and materials, especially for those who could not afford them.
On the contrary, carefully consider material and
nonmaterial incentives can be compliments in altering human behavior.
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