What about the new potential producers, Mozambique, other countries that have made large discoveries of gas and are hoping to get into this business? So let's look at the LNG world because you are mentioning Mozambique, you could mention Tanzania. Yes, this is all those. You could mention Israel and even Cyprus. The problem is the window of opportunity to sell gas around 2020 is now closing down for this LNG. So all those projects will be for after 2020. Interestingly enough, what we've seen in Europe and this was one of the call we had earlier this year, the question of prices in Europe does matter for LNG project coming after 2020. If you have extremely high prices, then those project could enter the European market. If you have lower prices and we can say that the nine or eight dollars per million BTU is this element, then you're back to what you are saying, we are not going to build a new LNG plant if prices in Europe are around eight. So therefore, Cortes issued they sell gas form that has managed to get the right price in Europe since the last 12 months, those projects have been delayed and we haven't seen any FID on those projects. Even, we can say we've seen reverse in terms of news flow, we've seen Woodside leaving Israel meaning no Israeli LNG. We've seen Shell selling their stake in Woodside which means that they think that the LNG is not so much a priority, a business for them or at least. In Australia, we've seen some companies willing to sell their assets in Canada in LNG. So that's the first part of the LNG story and again, if you think that you may face a price war in 2020 in Europe, then you may not be very willing to initiate an LNG plant. Interestingly enough, perhaps to finish on this. In Mozambique, Eni is perhaps making more money by selling their stake to the Chinese and backing in the CapEx that could lead to LNG later on but you're making a short term gain right now instead of having to invest and monetizing the resource in the long-term. That's down the road, yes. So that's also perhaps what shareholders are hoping to gain in the near future. Let's look now at the pipe gas because there are one pipe gas project. It's Shah Deniz 2. Yes. Shah Deniz 2 did get an FID late last year. Again, it did get an FID at a time where European prices were high and this gas was supposed to be certain market prices. Today, at lower prices, it may be more difficult for this gas to come into Europe and to make a profit. So interestingly enough, perhaps the FID of Shah Deniz 2 did allow the European players to benefit or the European consumers benefit from lower gas prices. But what you're saying on the joint-venture owning Shah Deniz is that the Total and the starter of this world, have exited, have sold their stake. Yes. I mean, when you look together the fact that Russia has a lot of flexibility and that other projects are vulnerable to low prices, does this mean that Russia could deliberately, flood the market and prevent these other projects from ever coming into life or? Yes, and I think for example, this is the risk the market didn't understand in Poland for Shell gas in Poland. People were thinking, we could be able to produce Shell gas in Poland whatever the price is because we have expensive Russian gas. Yes. But this is an expensive Russian gas on the price level, not on a cost level and so therefore, Russia had the ability to reduce the price in Poland to make those project that on top, happened to be more difficult and more costly than what people were thinking and happened to delay this project and so far, we haven't seen any major breakthrough in Shell gas in Poland. So if we look into the future, can Europe ever become independent from Russian gas or is there an accommodation possible of the current tensions? So what we've seen in the recent past after the Crimea annexation is that the tension have escalated between EU and Russia. We have now an endless list of problems which are running from how can Gazprom use or not use the OPAL, that is the pipe that is just at the exit of North Stream which is the Russia that has done some claim at the WTO organization against the EU Third Energy Package which is the anti-competitive cases the EU has against Gazprom. So we have a lot of those problems. My belief is that those problems are so big and you can also add sanctions, and you can also add South Stream, that it cannot be solved on a technical one-to-one level. I think that the problems will be viewed and will have to be viewed on a global level, and this has to be solved on a political level. The decision from President Putin to stop South Stream is perhaps signaling that he wants these global problems to be solved at the political level and so therefore, with him. Yes, so you think that the entire question of which pipelines will be built, how this is going to be managed, which rules will be imposed, as we speak up in the air and it certainly will not be resolved anytime soon? It is a very complex file, very complex negotiations are required. It's been going on for so long and there is, I feel sociological animosity and mistrust that has built up? No? Yes, very long lengthy negotiation, no step forward, we could say. Again, this is why at one stage, you have either to divorce if you can but then it costs you a lot or you have to say, well, we are going to repair bits and pieces, but it has to be done by the two people that have the power to decide this. Interestingly enough, I also have to point out that the decision of President Putin was taken the first of December, which is also the day the new head of the EU council took his position, which is the former prime minister from Poland, Donald Tusk. There is no great sympathy? I think it's a question of political will more than sympathy. So the question is what do we want to do, where do we want to go? Remember, in the gas industry, as in the energy industry, the lead time is 10 years and the minimum amount is 10 billion of dollars or euros, or whatever. Yes. So when I'm talking about those things, we need to understand where we want to be in the future and the main question at the EU level, is we've decided to go for the Energy Union and in the coming quarters, we will have to decide what Energy Union means, and how do we want to enact this? Yes. Now, you said at some point that you were talking about Europe excluding Turkey, this is interesting. What can be said about Turkey because Turkey is a very rapidly growing gas market? Absolutely right. I said that I was excluding Turkey because if I look at the EU gas demand, it's going down, it has peaked into some five, and as you said, "The EU gas demand in Turkey is growing by something like 10 percent per annum in the 10 years," so Turkey is a great market in terms of gas. So this is why when I think analysts are putting Turkey in Europe, you end up with a blurred picture because you're averaging something that goes up and something that goes down. So therefore, you don't have the trend, first element. Second element, remember that there is, so far, no major pipeline between Turkey and Europe. This is old but it's going to be built. Third element, Turkey is outside the EU and so therefore, it's not a transport, it's a transit issue. So therefore, if you are at the EU level, is Turkey going to operate as a transit, is Turkey willing to be a hub? All those question are still on the table. Yeah, but this raises several questions, could Turkey become more important for the European Union because of its potential to become a transit hub and is it wise of the European Union to keep Turkey outside of Europe, at least from this point of view? Yeah, Turkey will be absolutely important for Europe if Turkey were the hub but it seems that those Turkish authorities are not very much interested in having this as a hub. So they are more interested in having it as a transit, having the country as a transit. Being a hub needs a lot of things, you need a lot of investment in terms of CapEx, in terms of infrastructure, in terms of pipes, regas trading desk, etc, and transparency, and full transparency of the system. Yes. I'm not so sure the Turkish government is really in favor of this. It's easier for a government to say, well I'm a transit and I'll ship gas from A to B, and I'll take a fee for this. Yes. If you do this, you're less important for Europe and also, if you do, this then Europe has to bear in mind that I'm going to swap a Ukrainian transit risk for a Turkish transit risk. Yes, absolutely. If it is purely a transit, I don't think it's as important or as interesting, yes. Okay. So in the end, a few years back, we were all very optimistic about the future of gas and even recently, it's just a few years that the International Energy Agency published a book on the golden age of gas but it seems now that the picture is not as brilliant, is it? Yeah Jacob, I don't want to be very pessimistic but I've been one of the few that had said, "We are entering a new demand growth in terms of gas demand in Europe." As you said, I was the most bearish on the energy scene and I have been consistently wrong, being too optimistic at the end of the day, and what we have is the coal now is we are entering terminal decline. So I really think back to the golden age of gas, it has been on the book but not on numbers at the EU level. If anything, the trend has always been the opposite for the last 10 years. Yes, thank you very much. I think on this sobering note, we can conclude our discussion today. Thank you. Thank you, Jacob.
