7.2 'Nuclear and Conventional Weapons'

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Del curso dictado por Saint Petersburg State University

Russia and Nuclear Arms Control

27 calificaciones

Saint Petersburg State University

Russia and Nuclear Arms Control

27 calificaciones

As a state with one of the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons Russia is a key participant of nuclear non-proliferation regime and defines nuclear arms control as a priority of its foreign policy. This course will discover the logic and the frames of Russian nuclear arms control policies. You will learn the historical background and the modern context of bilateral US-Russian relations in nuclear arms control and understand how these relations influence the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. You will get the basic tools for analyzing Russian defence and security policy in regards to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Upon the completion this course the students will… ...be able to - analyze the actions of a state from the point of view of the present treaties on nuclear arms control; - come up with their own opinion on the problem commented by the arms control experts; - make arguments supporting their position in discussions of nuclear arms control. ...get to know - the technical, political and strategic aspects of agreements on nuclear arms control; - the content of arms control treaties in which Russia participates; - the trustworthy informational resources dedicated to the problem of nuclear arms control. ...be familiar with - the special terminology in the area of arms control; - the modern state and the perspectives of international policy regarding nuclear arms control; - the basics of Russia’s nuclear arms control policy.

De la lección

Challenges to the Regime

7.1 'UAV: Missile or Drone?'6:41

7.2 'Nuclear and Conventional Weapons'7:23

7.3 'Trust But Verify'13:15

7.4 'Sore Subjects of Missile Defence'8:06

7.5 'Conclusion'2:31

Conoce a los instructores

Anastasia A. Malygina
Assistant Professor
Department of Theory and History of International Relations
Andrey Y. Pavlov
Professor
Department of Theory and History of International Relations

As you remember, the precondition for the effectiveness of the regime is

a relative transparency in the intentions and capabilities of the participating states.

During the Cold War era,

the two nuclear superpowers had so many nuclear warheads in their arsenals that

the conventional weapons could hardly play

a negative role in undermining the strategic stability.

However, in the 21 century,

the rapid technological change created new challenges to

the nuclear arms control regime that exists on the bilateral level.

The United States are actively developing

the capabilities for precision guided munitions.

The development of the technology of precision guided munitions

significantly enhance the offensive capability of conventional weapons,

and this undermines the strategic stability,

and is perceived by Russia as

a significant threat to bilateral nuclear arms control regime.

The question that is being actively discussed in Russian expert and political circles,

is how significant the development of precision guided munitions technology

can undermine the strategic stability.

This system that is already available in

the United States is by now the most advanced conventional weapons technology.

The US military strategists highly value the capacity of this new advanced technology,

and predict that this technology could be used not only for conventional deterrence,

but for solving the tasks in different types of conventional forces operations.

I should highlight here,

that the long range precision guided

weapon systems are very

threatening and challenging to the strategic stability because potentially,

they can be used for

an initial counter force strike to undermine the retaliation potential of Russia.

Today, the debate concerns itself regarding the influence of the

U.S. conventional Prompt Global Strike program on the strategic stability.

This program supposes the development of

new technologies like hypersonic X-51 systems,

and the use of such traditional technologies as ICBMs and SLBMs.

Such uncertainty regarding the U.S. plans on

conventional Prompt Global Strike program was

perceived by Russian experts as a potential challenge.

In order to support strategic stability,

Russia raised this question during the negotiations

about the regulation of offensive nuclear strategic armaments,

but that has only partially solved the problem.

As you remember, in the new 2010 START Treaty,

non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs were recognized as non deployed,

and were included among the restrictions.

However, the deployment of

high precision weapons that were perceived by Russia as most challenging,

were not restricted by any bilateral arrangement.

In July 2013, Dmitry Ragozin stated that under existing U.S. estimates,

the US high precision weapons can destroy

80 or 90 percent of Russia's nuclear potential.

The studies that based these estimates are still unclear,

and there is no evidence that such estimates were made by US experts.

Nevertheless, Ragozin's claim had a symbolic meaning,

it showed that the Russian officials were seriously concerned about

the destabilizing potential of American precision guided weaponry.

This case shows how the lack of transparency regarding the intentions,

plans and capabilities of

the participating states challenge the compliance with the restrictions.

For quite a long period of time there was

a clear distinction between the conventional armaments and the nuclear armaments.

For a quite long period of time,

Russia and the United States negotiated the regulation of

nuclear strategic forces separately from the issue of limiting conventional forces.

However, the rapid technological change made it

impossible to keep those two issues separated.

In the contemporary environment,

it is almost impossible to negotiate the future measures of limiting

strategic nuclear forces separate from the issue of

regulating the development of conventional forces technology.

This understanding has already found its reflection in the official Russian position.

Russian military doctrine of the version 2014 declares that the function

of strategic deterrence may be insured by nuclear or non nuclear means.

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