So the conclusion is that we are looking at is or in someways China is increasing similar to the West with its raising economic growth, with its raising income equality as with education we can see very important differences in these similarities. And just as with the definition of social status and the pattern of social mobility, education and social mobility, the distribution of wealth and property have been and are still substantially different between China and the West. The similarities are that in each population, you have a population of have a lots. in the West maybe 1% has 34% of wealth in China it may not be 1% it may be 10% having 34% of wealth but still there are have a lots. The difference is largely not so much in the have a lots, but it's in the have nots. In the west you have 40% of the population, 40% of the households having zero wealth. Whereas in China, according to the 2011 China Household Finance Survey, the rate of urban home ownership for the bottom 25% by household income is nearly 77%, only 11% lower than the top 25%. Of course the difference is, the top 25% as a nice urban condo in Beijing the bottom 25% may have a rural farmhouse somewhere in [UNKNOWN] province, but at least they have property. In the United States in 2004 the bottom 40% of households possess only 0.2%. Of total household wealth, in contrast to the top 1%, who own 34%. So in the West, of course, the number of have nots decreased from 90% to just 40% but at the same time was not as well recognized. And it's not just the persistence of this have not population but their increasing vulnerability to the vagaries of, of the business cycle, because whereas before modern economic growth these have nots were largely tenant farmers. People who at least farmed the land, who had a kind of moral economy, that they shared their resources with other villagers that they had ties to landlords increasingly with the moving from the moral economy to the a capitalist industrial economy. These have nots were just thrown on the on the, on the marketplace without the safety net of the moral economy. So the agricultural reforms in the beginning of the 19th century increased rural social stratification, by creating a class of landless who are now totally depended on actual wages. So they didn't earn money then they didn't have any resources whatsoever. And this made their lives particularly vulnerable to short-term economic stress and another major contrasting study between rural villages in southern Sweden, eastern Belgium, northern Italy, northeast China, and northeast Japan. Which we will discuss at length and great detail in part two of this class which will be next year. We discover that the, the landless. during this process, in Europe became particularly vulnerable to short-term economic stress. In some European populations, mortality among, for example, day laborers and artisans increased by 13%, when real wages declined by 10% while the response among freeholders and tenants wasn't statistically significant at all. In fact in southern Sweden, in Scania, the breadbasket of Sweden, a decrease in real wage by slightly more than half would increase mortality among the landless by almost 80%, but produced no real significant effect on the landed. So in other words, what we have in the West where the transition of the world to this capitalist economy is this increasing vulnerability of the have nots. So it's the persistence of the have nots and their increasing vulnerability which is a major social problem in the West. In China, the vulnerability and the number of have nots has severely decreased with economic growth. but even though income is becoming increasingly unequal, with an enormous rural to urban migra, migrants a flow of 145 million. urban citizens having originated from China's villages, housing wealth remains more equally distributed. in fact, even the urban migrants, according to the 2011 survey, almost, over 1 3rd of urban migrants, roughly 19 million of these 145 million households, have apartments in their hometowns where their home village is. So most people's basic needs, in other words, are at least minimally satisfied, and therefore the implications of income inequality. Are simply not the same because in the West if you have no wages then you're free to live in a cardboard box. In China if you have no wages you're free to go home, and that's a very big difference. So the puzzle, then, that we're going to deal with in week four is how did China historically and comparatively egalitarian society in terms of the allocation of landed property, became the paragon the model of agrarian revolution in the 20th century. Why did the Chinese Communist Revolution succeed, while other revolutionary moments where wealth distribution were far more unequal failled. So go back to who got what, why, and its relationship to regime change. For that we'll turn to week four. Wealth distribution and regime change. Thank you.