Now the next stage, and again I want to emphasize that these are very large sort of categories and, and generalities. We're going to see exceptions throughout. I want to just get you a sense of how the basic organization, the structure of these institutions, of these forms of violence changes. And the next stage is state-commission armies. These are the beginning in the 70th through the 80th century. These are forces that are raised solely among the subjects of irrelevant power. That is, increasingly you have less and less dependence on mercenary forces. They're still going to play a role even well into the 18th century, the British army, for example, had a mercenary regiments within it when they were fighting the American colonials. But increasingly what we see is that participation in the armed force is restricted to the subjects of the relevant power. Officers in these case have a personal institutional loyalty to the commanding authority. That is they're not simply contractors, they often are members of the aristocracy and this is a way, in a sense, of establishing their position within the state power. You get a different kind of organization. Probably the most important is the regiment. This, this indicates a new level of aggregation a new level of organization. And the technologies available may be the most important. They are the musket and the bayonet. And for these you, as we're going to see in a little bit, it requires a completely different kid of organization not just in battle, but also preparing for battle. As this technologies changes as the structures change, what the societies have to do in order to produce these kinds of armies is transform. We get changes in the state. The next, perhaps most radical stage is what we might call a popular conscript army. This is the model for the 19th and the 20th Century. These of armies of citizens, so we have retained this idea that from the earlier stage that one has to be a subject or a citizen, increasingly that difference will become relevant as we will talk about later of the particular state for what one is fighting. This is based on the legion moss. The mass conscription which is born in the French Revolution and it's need to protect itself from counter attacks of traditional powers in Europe. The French Revolution, because of the destruction of the Bourbon Army partly through the revolution, partly through exiles, et cetera, they have to recreate their armed force, and what they do is they go to the citizenship itself. They ask citizens to participate in this army, not as slaves, not as professionals, but as members of this single community. Rank and privileges are linked to service. So we have a step away from the kind of slave armies and in a sense a step away from these commission armies or these mercenary armies, we're now increasingly rank is going to depend, rank becomes more meritocratic one of the great revolutions in this sense of the Napoleonic army, is this sense of military service, and military rank, being rewarded on the basis of merit, not birth. You get a professionalization, if you will, of the military. You get a rationalization of this military as, it is growing. You also get the creation of a new kind of loyalty, and that is loyalty to the larger unit. It is no longer about loyalty to the lord, it is no longer about loyalty to the specific aristocrat, it is no longer loyalty to even to a regiment. It becomes an emotional loyalty, one that's very much linked to the newly created nation-state. You get armies of patriots. And again, this also begins with the French Revolution. The technology remains relatively stable, although we will see that you get increases in the efficiency of firearms. You, the pike of course, disappears. The bayonet becomes less and less important. And you get what we're going to call, and we're going to see this later on, a gunpowder revolution. That we're, the, the central weapon becomes this delivery of a shot, and as we get into the 19th Century with rifling, et cetera, you get ever more accuracy. What you see is an increase in ferocity. What you see is a much larger killing ratio throughout the 19th Century. So not only do you have many more people doing it, but their capacity to inflict death on each other also increases. Now, this model basically continues through the world wars. Again, with exceptions. Britain has a very different system except during the wars. The United States follows closer to the British model rather than the German or the French one. But the senses of these armies representing their nations and these and these large conglomerations and aggregations. Over the last 30 or 40 years we've seen a final shift to what, what I call the Volunteer-technical. Actually John Lyn calls the Volunteer-technical. This does not involve the mass population, but it requires more from individual practitioners and relies in a sense more on a contractual relationship. That is we, we go back in some ways to previous patterns. No longer do you have this mass participation. No longer do you need to involve the entire nation in this process. No longer do you have relatively unprofessionalized people participating in it. Now what you have is the creation of yes within your own nation they're not purely mercenary but they're professionals who might have somewhat of a contractual relationship with the military. This means it's a privatization of a public duty. Where before everyone was supposed to participate now only this small group is supposed to participate. Where before you had generalists who required training, because they didn't have the tools and the skills necessary when they arrived in the Army. Now what you have is professionals, who have privatized in a sense this service and are being compensated by the state for their role. As we will see, this change towards the volunteer or towards the professional army signifies a very critical shift in the kind of relationship between the military and the society, and we'll be coming back to that in a minute. [BLANK_AUDIO]
